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9 Whatever is proper to a Natural species condition is morally good if the summation of all and every Natural species conditions (i.e., general, generic conditions) are mutually life-affirming in an environmental perspective—5−8.

10 The prudential values set out in premise #4 (for individuals) can be generally life-affirming in an environmental perspective—9.

11 Prudential values for particular individuals in an environmental context become general moral values when they attach to generic Natural species conditions—9, 10.

12 The prudential values set out in premise #4 are morally good and incur positive moral duties on all (capable of voluntary action) to facilitate outcomes that are life-affirming in an environmental perspective—4, 9, 11.

Argument Two, though it begins with prudential values (seen from the perspective of individual natures), transcends to the ethical when the understanding of the relationship between humans and their fundamental definition is generalized within the environmental context. This is because there is no longer an agent acting for themself only. Rather, the logical substitution instance is a generically described individual and, as such, could be understood as applicable to any substitution instance for the variable that has undergone universal generalization.